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Climate Change and Small Island States:
Adrift in a Raising Sea of Legal Uncertainty
by Jeremy Kelley*

I

n 1999, the rising sea level swallowed two islands of the
nation Kiribati.1 Rising sea level2 is one of the effects of
climate change to which small island nations are particularly susceptible.3 Considering that the average elevation of
this nation of ninety thousand people on thirty-three islands and
atolls4 is only about two meters above sea level,5 it is no surprise
that Kiribati’s President Anote Tong considers the rising sea a
threat to the very existence of his nation.6 Taking a cue from a
policy first announced by the Maldives, President Tong has suggested that the solution to his nation’s disappearance could be
purchasing land in another country to relocate the entire population of Kiribati.7 This unprecedented situation raises the question: what would be the legal status of an I-Kiribati or Maldives
population on the run from the rising waters?
Estimates vary, but it is undisputed that current and future
effects of climate change, including droughts, floods, desertification, and rising sea level, will displace millions each year.8 At least
some displacement will occur across borders, especially when
dealing with small islands nations. 9 In spite of this potential for
massive displacement, at present no international legal framework
exists which will recognize and protect those displaced by environmental factors, even though the concepts of “environmental”
and “climate” refugees have been contemplated since the 1980s.10
Two different approaches to the legal problems have been
proposed. On one hand there have been voices calling for an
expansion of the legal definition of “refugee” to incorporate
environmentally displaced persons,11 while others argue that a
new and separate legal framework be created.12 Island nations,
while supportive of finding an international legal solution, are
unwilling to wait for international consensus and are taking their
own measures to avoid catastrophe.13
“Refugee” is a legal term, narrowly-defined by the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, protecting persons who fled their home country in fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, political opinion, or ethnicity.14 In 2006,
the Maldives proposed amending the Convention to include
“climate refugee.”15 Recently, the Bangladeshi Finance Minister called for “[t]he [C]onvention on refugees [to] be revised
to protect [those displaced by climate change.]”16 However, the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) is concerned
that the inclusion of environmental or climate refugee could
potentially undermine the clarity of current standards.17 Further,
UNHCR is already under pressure from host countries to reduce
the burden of refugees18 and it is also concerned that renegotiation of the Convention could result in the lowering of existing
protection standards.19
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For these reasons, some argue that dealing with climate
refugees calls for a new and independent legal framework.20
Any new framework would need to draw upon widely agreed
principles and connect the protection of those displaced with the
broader international legal framework on climate change.21 The
international instrument would also need to address the practicalities of enforcement and establishment of rights.22
One proposed convention from the University of Limoges23 recognizes different types of environmental displacement,
protecting generally against “natural and technological disasters.”24 It calls for the creation of a monitoring agency akin to
the UNHCR.25 The convention would recognize the duty of the
international community to assist a State that suffers from ecological disasters26 and the right to “conserve the nationality of
[the environmentally displaced person’s] state of origin . . . and
to acquire the nationality of the receiving state.”27 This last right
is especially important for a nation such as Kirbati, where complete loss of territory could result in the destruction of its legal
status as a nation.
Territory is one of the key elements of nationhood28 and
without physical territory under sovereign control, no nation can
exist.29 On the other hand, nationality is considered a fundamental right in international law.30 How can this right be squared
with permanent loss of sovereign territory and nationhood? It
is unlikely that another nation would accept a cash payment to
transfer the sovereignty of a part of its existing territory. Certainly, consideration would have to be made for those already
settled upon the land.31 Without an existing legal framework,
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perhaps Kiribati and the Maldives are doing the right thing to
proactively seek out alternatives.
Beyond purchasing land, one plan currently underway is
to secure “merit-based relocation.”32 Island nationals would be
trained in needed professions (e.g. nursing) in other countries,
with the ability to stay and seek citizenship there.33 In this way,
pockets of I-Kiribati community would be built up worldwide,
facilitating future resettlement.34 Furthermore, with removal of
much of the population, it would be possible to build up one
island and use it to “anchor” the sovereignty of the nation in
the event of drastic sea level rise.35 However, even if the state
continued to exist in legal terms36 it is unclear how it would
function.37

The best choice may be for an island nation to be absorbed into
another nation, using its own sovereignty to pay for relocation.38
For example, in exchange for control of Kiribati’s sovereign territory, India could accept Kiribati’s population and provide resettlement assistance such as language training, vocational training, and
financial aid.39 An end to nationhood, incorporation and relocation of an island nation in exchange for the sovereign control of its
resources and maritime zone would then benefit both parties.40
The world will see an increase in environmentally displaced
persons in the coming years. Room must be made for them with
the creation of a new and separate legal framework.41 However,
this will take time. In the meantime, small island nations are best
served to take matters into their own hands.
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